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ORGANISATION INPUT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
BY 
To Y. SHEN1 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we develope a framework in which 
organisation is treated as an input in a production firm. The 
determination of an equilibrium organisation input is described,, 
Corresponding to the equilibrium, a quasi-rent is earned by the 
organisation. Improvements in efficiency and technological change 
are regarded as substitution of organisation input for labour and 
capital inputs. 
Development sequences of three types of firms are discussed. 
For the large firm in a mature economy, organisation input is primarily 
generated within the firm0 For the small firm in a mature economy, 
entry and exit play the vital role. For the firm in an underdeveloped 
country little organisation input is generated, and there are good 
economic reasons why the substitution of organisation input for other 
inputs is inefficient. It is a better strategy for an underdeveloped 
country to import organisation inputs (but not organisation stocks) 
when they are needed, because of the relatively low costs of organisation 
inputs generated in the mature economies. 
1. This paper was begun when I was a Ford Foundation Faculty 
Research Fellow and completed when I was a Rockefeller Foundation 
Research Professor at Makerere University in Uganda, I would like to 
acknowledge the support of: the two foundations. I would also like to 
thank Mrs. Edith Penrose and Harvey Leibenstein for their encouraganentj, 
and Bishop Shannon Mallory for retrieving the research notes for this 
paper from Uganda„ 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the literature the relationship between "firm" and 
"organisation" is generally ambiguous,, Frequently the two terms 
are used interchangeably0 For example, Mrs0 Penrose (a leading 
figure in the field) had written (20,, po305) that "in any economy, 
the basic unit of industrial production is the firm or the enterprise, 
for it is the firm that acquires the factors of production, organises 
them in the production process, designs the methods of production and 
the products, and usually surveys markets and arranges sales«, In 
particular the firm is the organisation through which innovations are 
put into practice,," This usage is misleading,, As many fruitful studies 
in recent years (13, 17) have shown, the behavior of the firm is 
significantly affected by its internal structure,, The basic purpose 
of the present paper is to establish a framework in which organisation 
is recognized specifically as a ccmponent of the firme In particular 
organisation is an input the "fourth factor of production" of 
Marshall0 It performs the tasks mentioned by Mrse Penrose, and is 
entitled to a remuneration like the other inputs,, The central issue 
in this framework is to determine the relationship between organisation 
performance and organisation income0 Once this issue is clarified, the 
role of organisation in economic development can be analysed0 
What is organisation? As a first approximation and in the 
context of a private enterprise economy, it is the team of "non-marginal 
product employees" in a firm (13), including managers, supervisors and 
staff employees like accountants, engineers and secretarieso This 
definition must be. extended,, An organisation should be time-specific. 
with respect to the. historical development of a firm, because the capabil 
of the team to perform its tasks depends on how long the team has worked 
together on these tasks0 It also includes the written and unwritten 
constitution, by-laws, rules, codes and habits prevailing in the firm, 
all of which combine to determine, the roles of inputs by means of 
production layout, task definitions, communication channels and 
2 
decision rules. With these extensions, a one-to-one correspondence 
can be. established between the stock of organisation at the beginning 
of a period and the level of its task performance, with given supply 
of other inputs and given technology® 
20 According to March and Simon (17), organisations are 
"assemblages of interracting human beings" and are characterised by 
"specificity in role, in channel and context of communication". 
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Organisation input is a fl.ow0 A norm of organisation input, 
may be defined as that input which maintains the organisation stock of 
a firm at a constant level in a time period. But organisations are by 
their nature dynamic0^ Individuals on the team grow and the composition 
of the. team changes over time0 The working relationship among the 
team members develops and the organisation responds to new stimuli 
provided by changes in the environments It is therefore more 
appropriate, to define a dynamic norm of organisation input, as that 
input which keeps the organisation stock of a firm growing at the 
average rate for the industrya When organisation input for a particular 
firm exceeds this norm, the level, of organisation performance, is raised 
relative to the industry average and its organisation stock becomes 
larger® Thus measured against the norm, organisation stock is the 
cumulative sum of past organisation inputse 
The total organisation input in an economy is more than the 
mere sum of organisation inputs of firms0 Even if we include as firms 
subsistence farms« governments and non-profit institutions, there is 
still much more to be included in the organisation stock of the economye 
Moral tradition, laws, informal, associations and other social, bonds are. 
all part, of the organisation stocks By social interaction new 
organisation inputs are incessantly injected into the e.conomye These 
inputs can influence the performance level, of firms as much as the 
inputs generated by their own organisations0 However we will not go 
beyond the firm organisations in this paper and will, simply assume that 
organisation inputs orginating outside of. the firm organisations affect 
all firms to the same degree® 
Turning to organisation income, the differential in 
performance level, associated with different organisation stocks gives 
rise to quasi«rent. An organisation can survive only if it manages 
some threshold level, of task performance in the long rune It earns a 
quasi^rent if its performance exceeds the threshold. The coherence of 
an organisation derives from the. fact that by co»operation the members 
of an organisation can contribute more to output than if they 
work individuallye But this is insufficient for the survival, of an 
organisations Only when an organisation is able to earn a positive 
30 Kal.dor. (10) had pointed out; '-The function which lends 
uniqueness and determinateness to the firm — the ability to adjust, 
to co«ordinate»-~ is an essentially dynamic function; it is only 
required so long as adjustments are required, and the extent to which 
it is required depends on the frequency and the. magnitude, of the 
adjustment, to be undertaken,," 
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quasi-rent will its owners have a vested interest in keeping it going. 
An on-going organisation, of course, has a better chance of perpetuating 
itself because of the cumulative nature of the organisation stock. 
There is no need here to distinguish Schumpeter's entrepreneurial 
profit from quasi-rents the fomer is a special case of the latter. 
Entrepreneurial profit is incurred when the organisation input 
generates something novel., such as a new product or a new production 
relationship. 
Monopoly profit, on the other hand, is something different 
and requires a new definition in our framework. At times, the threshold for 
quasi-rent is raised so high that only a single firm survives in an 
industry0 It becomes a monopoly. Quasi-rent based on the organisation 
differential between the monopolist and the best-qualified potential 
entrant would still set a limit to profit unless there are other barriers 
to entry that permit monopoly pricing. The excess profit over the quasi-
rent (based on the organisation differential) represents monopoly 
profits The usefulness of this definition will be demonstrated in our 
emprical. analysis of the. case of underdeveloped economies,. 
We now come to the meaning of organisation performance. It is 
useful, to distinguish two types of tasks engaged in by organisations. The first 
is growth and technological, change,^ the former a movement on the production 
surface and the latter a shift of the production surface itself. The mechanics 
4. The owners of the firm are also owners of its organisation so 
long as they are legally entitled to decide on the disposal of organisation. 
Because of the close complementarity between organisation and capital 
earnings, they are usually also the owners of the capital stock* 
5. "The strong commitments of individuals in interpersonal 
relations that are of intrinsic importance to them tend to make the 
continuation of the association a supreme value." (4) 
6. Since growth almost inevitably involves technological change, 
the two are combined in our subsequent analysis,, Substitution between 
capital and labour with given technology is left out because we have 
found it (24) to be of limited quantitative significance. 
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of their execution by a firm organisation have been ably described by Mrs. 
Penrose,, (21.) We shall identify the organisation stock responsible for this 
type of: task as Pcfactor. The second type of task is to improve X-efficiency, 
a movement towards the production surface® The dynamics here were analysed 
in two well-known papers by Leibenstein. (1.1,13) The associated organisation 
stock will accordingly be referred to as L-factor. 
Although the distinction between P«factor and L=°faetor facilitates our 
analysis, they are closely related,, Typically growth and technological, 
change require installation of. new capital, equipments This affords a chance 
to break the existing inertia, the basis of X«inefficiency. On the. other hand 
the. inexperience with the operation of new technologies results in new 
efficiency. The demands for P-'factor and for L-factor are therefore inter-
dependent <, On the. supply side the same organisation provides the resources 
for the build-up of both factors. Parkinson had observed that among firms 
there, are two types of organisation personalities, male and fanale, which are 
parallel to superior endowments of P-factor and L-factor. But a textbook 
substitution relationship underlies these personalities,, X-efficiency has an 
upper bound determined by the state of technical knowledge and the art of 
management. Diminishing returns set. in when the supply of either P-factor 
or I-factor rises. A balance between the factors is established by substitution. 
Organisation personalities arise when the supply costs of the two factors vary 
for different firms. 
It is important to stress the. superiority of organisation in 
comparison to individual entrepreneurs— as a catalyst of: change6 Division 
of labour and specialisation enhance, the capabilities of an organisation. More, 
information is pooled. Organisation behaviour also tends to be more rational 
and deliberate (1), even though it may inhibit creativity. Dynamically the 
scope of growth of an organisation is vastly greater® An organisation has a 
time horizon beyond that of: individuals and can absorb new members when needed. 
This list is by no means complete, yet it should suffice to demonstrate the 
greater potential, of organisations. 
We will use the concepts introduced above as the. basis of a model in 
the next section,. We will show how, under some assumptions, there is a tendency 
for firms to converge, towards an equilibrium — at. the dynamic norm of 
organisation input mentioned earlier. The. model applies well to large firms 
in a mature economy; for small firms modifications are needed. We then turn 
no the underdeveloped economies. With an empirical illustration we focus 
7. According to the Parkinsey Law (19), there are male organisations, 
aggressive, outward«»looking and growth oriented; and female organisations, 
scrupulous, inwards looking and efficiency-oriented. The male organisations 
acquire the female organisations in mergers. 
4 
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on the difficulties in generating new domestic, organisation stocke In the 
final section we analyse the option of importing organisation stock to under« 
developed economies by way of. multinational corporations. We conclude that 
policies to build up domestic organisation stock, either directly or through the 
instrument; of multinational corporations, are of dubious merito The direct 
importation of organisation input, when needed has a higher payoff for countries 
in early stages of economic development, 
THE MODEL 
We have defined the organisation stock of a firm in terms of the level 
of its perfomance, Its income is a quasi-rent, based on performance, differencial. 
This provides the. centre piece of a model, that we shall, now describe in 
geometric terns, The limited supply of organisation stock for a given firm and 
the inevitable diminishing returns governing its deployment suggest that the 
model will possess equilibrating properties. In a sense then the model, 
represents an extension of Leibenstein's demonstration of an X-inefficiency 
equilibriums Alternatively the model may be regarded as an attempt to 
synthesise the theories of Mrs« Penrose and Leibenstein, 
The assumptions needed for our model includes 
(l.) Firms operate in a single.product industry characterised by 
competitions The price of the product is determined in each period by demand 
and supply. Supply is altered over time, by growth of firms and by entries and 
exits, 
(2) Each firm possesses a stock of organisation and the organisation 
runs the firm. The. decision rule followed by the organisation is the 
maximisation of the discounted stream of quasi-rents, The same set of 
complete information about the future is accessible to all firms, but the 
cost of obtaining this information varies inversely with the stock of 
organisation possessed by a firm0 
(3) Differences in the. routine production (described by the relationship 
between non®organisation inputs and outputs) of firms are attributable to their 
differences in the values of the decision variables; scale of operation, 
technology and X~efficiency® 
(4) Cardinal indices can be assigned to represent each of the decision g 
variables,, Divisibility is implied, so that incremental, changes in the values 
of the decision variable are permissible. There is also irreversibility? except 
in the case of exit, the decision variable values do not decline,. 
(5) Organisation input is required to execute changes in the decision 
variable values. In particular a positive monotonic relationship exists between 
organisation input and the extent to which decision variable values may be 
raised in a period. 
8, An emprical attempt to assign such indices is reported in (24), 
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(6) Expansion (in the scale of operation) requires the installation 
of new capital equipment, and this equipment embodies best-practice technology« 
(7) New technology is more capital intensive (24), and hence can 
be adopted only by the installation of new (best-practice) capital equipments 
Technological change may be carried out either by replacement or by expansion* 
(8) X-efficiency improvement acts on labour productivity and affects 
capital productivity only because there are substitution and complementarity- rela-
tionships between capital and labours 
In addition, environment must remain unchanged if a firm, starting from 
a point of disequilibrium, is to move towards and ultimately reach an equili-
briums The most important environmental constants for our model, are: 
(1) the organisation stock and the organisation input generated by 
the stock as measured against the industry average; 
(2) the rate of cha.nge of the best«-practice technology; and 
(3) consumer demand for the product of the industry assumed to be 
somewhat inelastic8 
We start by considering the role of the ;£«.factor in the replacement 
decision. In Tanel (a) of Figure One, the revenue and cost associated with 
replacement are. shown to be functions of the. rate of replacements For the 
profit maximising firm the optimal replacement rate is at the point where the 
distance between the two functions is at a maximum® The position of the revenue, 
and the cost functions for a given firm is affected by two crucial factors^ The 
first is the technology gap9 or the difference in the technology index between 
the firm in question and the bestopractice technology® Let T-* be the technology 
index of the best-practice technology and T the technology index of the fiam, 
then the technology gap is T*«T0 A large technology gap implies the presence 
of a large proportion of inefficient capital equipment, and gain from replacement 
will be greatere Curves I, II and III in Panel (a) depict the replacement 
revenue function of three different plants in ascending order of technology ga.p0 
The replacement cost function shifts with, the endowment of fLfactor, 
or the capacity of the firm organisation to search and perceive profitable moves 
in technological change and then to plan, co=ordinate and execute the moves* 
A rich supply of P-factor lowers the adjustment costs for each rate of re-
placement and hence the replacement cost function® Curves A, B and G 
9s. Replacement revenue is the difference between the present values of 
two streams of discounted net revenues; one stream on the assumption of zero 
replacement, the other on the assumption that a certain replacement is carried 
out in the. periods Replacement cost refers to the collection of adjustment 
costs incurred as the result of replacement, including retraining and 
reorganisation cost.s0 For a more detailed discussion on the separation of 
routine production costs and adjustment costs, see Hart (8) and Baumol (3), 
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in Panel (a) depict the. replacement cost functions of three firms in 
descending order of P-factor endowment,, 
Panel (b) reiterates the. fact that the optimal rate of 
replacement is an increasing function of both the technology gap (T*<-T) 
and the P~factor endowment® If firms stay on the optimal replacement 
curves, then each firm will move towards an equilibrium rate of 
replacement as shown in Panel. (c)0 The curves in Panel (c) are 
transposed from (b) with modifications0 The vertical, axis now 
measures the rate of technological change resulting from replacement, 
DT;10 : r 
DT = (T0 - T ) 
r 2 l'r 
where T.2 is the technology index of a firm in Time Period 2, and T^ its 
technology index in Time Period 10 The subscript r refers to the fact that, replacement is the source of the technological change0 In 
addition, A, B and C 
P-factor endowmentso 
11 are now time paths for firms with different 
10® The transposition increases the curvature of the curves® 
Let the rate of replacement be (l )0 Thens 
DT = T0 - T, r / 1 
= a(T1) + (l-ct)T* = ^ 
= (1-a) (T*-Tx) 
Since 01.(1-a ) 1.1, DT^ is less than (T*-^) except at the origin. 
The ratio of DT to the rate of replacement increases with (T*-T). 
11. The time, path interpretation further increases the curvature of 
the curves. Consider two plants with initial technology index 
1 2 1 2 Tjj" and T^ respectively with T* = %(T*) and T^ = %(T*)0 (The superscripts 
refer to plant identities.) Let the rate of replacement for both plants b 
(1 -a ). 
Thens ? 
TJ - T^ - fc(T*) 
T1 ° T2 = a + ^ ° a " a ^l^ + (-1™a 
- <* (%)(T*) 
The technology gap between the two plants has narrowed. If the two plants 
lie on the same replacement curve, it means that, at the same rate of 
replacanent., DT is greater for the plant with a higher value of T*-T. 
Hence the time, path curvature is greater than the. cross section curve 
curvature. (This conclusion requires that the curve starts from a fixed 
origin and is continuous and monotonic. Normally these assumptions are met 
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The relationship illustrated in Panel (c) resembles the 
12 ordinary adjustment model with DT — A (T* - T)e Each act of 
']z 
replacement affects the value of (T* - T) in a subsequent period. 
Starting from a p for example, the firm will, move along the A-curve 
towards the origin. Now suppose that the best-practice technology 
itself is changing at a constant, and exogeneously determined rate 
DT*: 
DT* = (T| - T*) 
where Tjj and T* are the technology indices of the best-practice 
technology in Time Periods 2 and 1 respectively. Then clearly a 
is a stable equilibrium point for Firm A, whose rate of technological 
change DT is the same as DT* and whose technology gap (T* - T) remains 
constant. If all firms are in equilibrium, then they all have the same 
rate of technological change. However the rate of technological change 
will be higher for Firm A and its capital, assets will correspondingly 
be more,advanced. Provided that the endowments of P-factor for the 
different firms remain constant, there will be a stable ranking of firms 
with respect to technology. Depending on demand there will be a marginal 
firm whose technology is such that it earns zero quasi-rent. To the 
left of the marginal, firm larger and larger quasi-rents are earned by 
firms with smaller and smaller technology gaps. 
The model is easily extended to include expansion as an 
option for the deployment of P-factor. Panel (d) is analogous to 
Panel (a), except that the rate of expansion takes the place of the 
rate of replacement along the abscissa. The expansion revenue function 
and the expansion cost functions are defined in the same way as the 
corresponding replacement functions. The expansion revenue function 
rises with the rate of expansion, as the cost of production is lowered 
with the greater proportion of best-practice technology. The rate of 
increase diminishes since the demand curve for the industry is downward 
sloping. The expansion cost curve rises at an increasing rate because of 
the fixed P-factor endowment. As before, the point of maximum 
distance between the two functions determines the optimal rate of 
expansion. 
12. The value of A depends on T* - T and the endowment of 
Penrose Factor. 
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The position of the curves in Panel (d) also depends on the. 
technology gap and the P« factor endowment. To simplify the exposition, 
firms are assumed to be in replacement equilibrium initially. At 
this equilibrium there is a one»to«cne correspondence between 
technology gap and P.factor endowment. Firm A has a higher endowment 
of P»factor than B , yet their rates of technological change are. the 
same. It is plausible that the quantity of P-factor required for 
replacement depends on the rate of technological change rather than 
13 
on the rate of replacement. Consequently Firm A (and all firms to 
the left of the marginal firm) has idle reserve of P-factor that may 
be deployed for expansion. In the meantime. Firm A already enjoys a 
greater familiarity with the best-practice technology by virtue of its 
higher rate of replacement, so that it needs less P-factor to execute 
a given rate of expansion. This has the direct effect, of lowering the 
expansion cost function. If the surplus P-factor is converted to 
L-factor, Firm A can also expect a lower routine operation cost after 14 
the. expansion and hence a higher expansion revenue. Taking the two 
functions together, Firm A will have a higher expansion rate. 
Panel (e) is akin to Panel (c). The solid curves trace out 
the time path o;f: total, technological change, DT, the sum of changes in 
the technology index due to replacement and due to expansion. To 
illustrate, Firm A at replacement, equilibrium position, a^ expands and 
15 X 
its rate of total technological change is as. This brings the firm 
closer to T* in the next period. The rate, of replacement declines, 
13o The required changes in work arrangement and the. resistance to 
these changes are likely to depend on the. difference in machine design 
rather than the number of new machines, 
14, On the other side of the coin, if a Eism is deficient in Pffactor 
conversion of L~factor to P-factor to sustain a hypothetical rate of 
expansion will increase the routine costs after expansion, 
15, Although the time path to equilibrium will be somewhat different 
the. basic conclusions are not affected if plants do not reach the 
replacement equilibrium first and then expand. The key point is that 
a plant with idle P»factor will move closer to T* either by replacement 
or expansion until its distance from T* is consistent with its P-factor 
endowment. We may also note, that a" is necessarily greater in its value, 
of DT than b' and c 5 because (as we will argue presently) the time path 
from a® moves down more steeply. This condition is necessary so that 
the time path from b® will not cross the time path from a®, a 
contradiction of the main conclusion just reached from the discussion 
of Panel (d) 8 
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increasing the unused "P-factor available for more expansion.^ For 
a number of reasons, however, the time, path will move down towards 
First, it is likely that more P-factor is required for the same. 
installation of capital equipment if the installation is related to 
expansion rather than replacement,, The assimilation of; new staff, 
alter all, is usually more difficult than the reassignment of existing 
staffo Second, for the same installation of capital assets, expansion 
17 
entails a smaller change of technology index than replacement. Third, 
as a. firm moves closer to the ordinate (where T=T*) , a given installation 
of capital equipment (whether for replacement or expansion) has a 18 
diminishirg impact on its technology index. Finally, as a firm 
continues to expand, the same, rate of expansion requires a larger 
installation of capital assets, On the assumption of fixed T-factor 
endowment, the expansion cost function shifts upward and lowers the 
16. From the point of view of financial decisions, expansion and 
replacement are generally regarded as alternative options. As de. Leeuw 
had reported (6), firms consider depreciation allowance and savings 
from net profit as a single fund, to be used for replacement and 
expansion alike. The ratio of average post-war level of depreciation 
to net capital addition in manufacturing in the U.S. was 2.357. 
17. Let the rate of expansion be. g , and use the. notations of: 
footnotes 9 and 10o In en concentrating on the impact of expansion on 
the technology indexs 
DT = T, - T. e 2 1 
J T * + T.1 - T.( 
1 + 6 
= _ _ £ _ _ ( T*-T1) 
(1 + 6 ) 
If 3= (1 - a ), the rate of replacement in footnote 9, then; 
DT = \ - a (T* « T) e ' 
2 » a 
Since 0 <a- 1, DT (- I DT') is less than DT . — - 9 e —: r 2 - a i 
18. As the expression, for DT in the last footnote, shows, tor r e 
given 6 , DT is smaller if the value of (T---T,) is lower0 At the e i 
lirit the plant, attains T* and its DT equals to DT* if its rate of 
expansion is infinite. 
rate of optimal expansion® For all these reasons, the rate of 
technological change (DT) falls to a 0 Similarly Firm B comes to C. 
a rest at b and Firm C at c- . Firm A by 'virtue of its greater e e 
P-factor endowment will, enjoy a more advanced level of technology, 
a more rapid rate of growth and a higher quasi-rent® The rate of 
change of technology, on the other hand, is the same for all firms in 
equilibrium. 
Turning to L-factor, we focus on the routine operation costs of 
a firm with given technology® The conclusions reached by Leibenstein 
(12, 13) are. quite similar to our findings on technology0 There is also 
an equilibrating mechanism which guides the firms towards an equilibrium 
in X«efficiency, If X-efficiency improves exogeneously as a result of 
organisation or management innovations, competition leads to comparable 
increases in X-efficiency for all firms, At equilibriums, moreover, 
there is a stable rank ordering of f irms in X«>g.k.'. ficiency, corresponding 
to their endowment of L-factor (in our terminology)e 
To combine P«factor and L-factor in a single, model, we define a 
productivity index, Z, which .is a product of; the technology index T and 
an X-efficiency index E, We further define E in such a way that its 
value runs from 0 to l.»0, with 1,0 referring to production on the 
efficient production frontier® The best, productivity index Z* is equal 
to T", and . L rm wil l, be characterised by a productivity gap Z*«Z. 
The dynamics of L^factor are based on separate pull and push 
processes, A typical, pull process is described by the situation where 
new L-factor input generated by a firm in a time period is proportional. 
to its L-factor stock at the beginning of the periodG In this case, 
firms with high efficiency and advanced technology initially will have 
19 a higher improvement in productivity® The locus of equilibrium 
l9e For every firm. 
DT = T 2 - T] = DT* = CT 
DE *— E... — Cn 2 1 E 
where C„, and C_ are exogeneously determined constants because, the relative T E 
efficiency positions of the firms are assumed to be constant, It follows 
tha. t; 
DZ - /j, Z i I. 
^ T2E2-TlEl 
= CTCE + Op + T.LCE 
Firms with high ef f iciency (E., ) and advanced technology (Tj) initially 
will have a higher value of: DZ« 
12 -
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points for the firms becomes a line with a negative, slope instead of 
the horizontal line in Panel (e), leading to a widening gap between 
high productivity and low productivity firms® This is balanced by the 
push process, stressing the competitive pressure on the less efficient 
firm to catch up. High efficiency and advanced technology initially 
20 would result in lower X-efficiency improvement. 
If the push process is insufficient to offset the 
destabilising influence of the pull process, equalisation of productivity 
increase may still be.attained by the interaction between P-factor and 
L-factor. In particular, X-efficiency is likely to decline with 
installation of new capital equipment. Hence films with a small 
technology gap tend to have a larger X-efficiency gap. The. neutralisation 
minimises the impact of the pull, process. More importantly P-factor 
may be converted into L-factor and vice versa. Since improvanents in 
X-efficiency are subject to diminishing returns, L»factor is cor.vcvted 
into P-factor for firms with a small efficiency gap. The "excess" 
organisation stock can then be channelled into expansion, with the 
result that DZ is approximately equalised for all firms. Panel 
(e) then describes productivity change, with the abscissa relabelled Z-'-Z 
and the ordinate i.t .."'belled DZ The equilibrium rate of product ivity 
change for all firms ia given by the horizontal line at a height equal, 
to the product of DT* and DE. the average rate of efficiency 
improvement. 
Some of the propositions implied by our model are consistent 
with previous empirical findings on U.S. firms. The innovator firms 
are fast growers (16) and there is a "distinct relationship between 
the base year technology and the growth performance of manufacturing 
plants". (22). On the other hand our model appears to offer no 
20. If we assume that firms will attempt to improve their 
X-efficiency so that their overall cost positions relative to each 
other remain the same, then DZ is a constant (Cz) for all firms; 
DZ = Cz = Ct(E2 - Ex) + E1CT + T1(E2-E ) 
Here, as before, we assume that DT is a constant (as we have concluded 
from our model). Hence we haves 
E2«E1 = (cz - E1Ct)/(Ct T t) 
High efficiency and advanced technology initially result in lower 
X-efficiency improvement. 
lit -
explanation for two conspicuous phenomena; the paramount importance 
of entry and exit and the impermanence of the relative technology 
ranking of given firms-. Of 2,686>manufacturing plants in a sample, 
we found (22) that 1,61.7 had exited between 1935 and 1959; 60 
21 
percent of the initial total, ' In addition, "technology difference 
represents one of those persistent but impermanent competitive 
advantages" and "initial competitive advantages by plants with more 
advanced technology were largely dissipated within a decade". (22) 
Obviously we need to re-examine the assumptions of our models 
It is useful, to distinguish two development sequences for 
firms in a mature economys For small firms two important modifications 
to our model must be made. Because small firms have limited capital 
equipment, the divisibility assumption cannot be maintained* In the 
meantime the small stock of organisation possessed by a small firm is 
insufficient to plan, install and start up new capital equipments 
Instead this task is usually performed by the capital equipment 
manufacturers. Since the initial P-factor input is provided from 
outside, the organisation stock, of the firm no longer bears any . 
relationship to its level of technology,, These two features completely 
change the development sequence of the small, firm from that predicted by 
our models Whatever the organisation stock possessed by the. firm, it 
earns a high quasi-rent, in its early life, because of its small 
technology gap. The quasi-rent may be kept up for a while with 
improvauents in X-efficiency, Nevertheless, because of the lumpiness 
of capital, equipment relative to its total asset, expansion is not a 
real alternative even though the firm is earning high quasi-rents. 
The lack of an opportunity to display its organisation capabilities 
also prevents the firm frcm distinguishing itself in the outside 
capital market. Subsequently its technology gap is widened by 
obsolescence, while new opportunity to improve on its X-efficiency 
becomes increasingly more. limited. The. qua si-'rent declines, crosses the 
zero threshold and the firm expires. This life cycle is still further 
shortened in many cases by the departure of key individuals in the 
firm organisation^ The smal.ln.ess of the. organisation makes it 
vulnerable to such departures. 
2ls The exit rate is associated with technology levelc Of the 
"very advanced technology" plants in l9 J5, percent had exited by 
1959, while of the "very backward" plants 79 percent had exited,, 
(22, ps 99) 
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This sequence appears to be consistent with the empirical 
findings mentioned earlier? Several features may be noted0 First, 
organisation has almost no import in the development sequence 
which may well explain why organisation was neglected in the neo» 
22 
classical theory of the firm,. Superiority in the organisation 
stock has only a minor impact on quasi-rent, Since the firm could 
not expand, generation of new organisation input is also discouraged^ 
Second, entry and exit alone are crucial? new technology and improvement 
in X--efficiency in the economy are both direct results of new entries, 
while the average productivity is also raised by the exit of aged firms.. 
Third, the rate of entry and exit is determined by the rate of change 
of the best^practice technology through the mechanism of quasi-rent 
determination. This preserves our conclusion that productivity 
increase in the industry is determined by the rate of increase of 
the best-practice technology,. 
But our model is by no means irrelevant. With the organisation 
revolution, large firms - sometimes created, sometimes formed by merger, 
sometimes by growth of the exceptional small firms « are becoming 
increasingly important in a mature economy, and our model gives a 
fairly realistic description of the large firms. With a large firm, 
the P»factor relevant for the planning and installation of new 
capital equipment is internalised because the firm organisation is 
large enough to handle it and has a competitive advantage in doing 
so based on its intimate knowledge of the firm* The P-factor 
endowment of the firm is therefore responsible for the technology gap, 
just as we have assumed in the model. The ! umpnesg of "capita^ 
equipment also loses its signifir.ance: relative to the total assets 
of the firm most capital equipment may be regarded as divisible, 
Large quasi^rents earned in a period can be used for immediate 
expansion. Superior P-factor endowment will not remain idle, and 
ample incentive is provided for the generation of new organisation-
input.. The large organisation also has a continuity and a stability. 
With stable stocks of P-factor and L-factor the firms are likely to 
stay in equilibrium. For large firms, therefore, organisation assumes 
22. In contrast, most of the literature on organisation theory 
and on behavior theory of the firm applies to large firms, where 
organisation does occupy an important place. 
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a central role both in productivity increase and in determining the 
fortunes of the firm. This is true unless the firm turns into a 
monopoly — then the situation will, be quite similar to the 
underdeveloped economy case to be described in the next section0 
THE UNDERDEVELOPED ECONOMY 
As the catalyst of technological change and efficiency 
improvement, organisation input is at the heart of economic development® 
But what type of organisation input is needed? What determines its 
supply? Are government policies called for? We will discuss these 
issues in abstract and then introduce some illustrative empirical 
evidence. It turns out that, despite the limited supply of 
organisation input in underdeveloped economies, the required 
P-factor can usually be supplied from abroad with the installation 
of new capital equipment® The. denand for L-factor is insignificant; 
in early stages of development the wage rate is so low that 
wage savings from higher efficiency may not even compensate for the 
costs of organisation input® Large efforts to build up domestic 
organisation input do not appear to be justified. 
Cultural norms, personality traits, inexperience and level 
of education are among the factors (9) limiting the supply of non-
marginal product workers in modern sectors of underdeveloped economies. 
To accommodate the shortage of the organisation stock, most of the 
plants were planned, installed and set up for operation by foreign 
capital, equipment manufacturers or technical, assistance teams. Little 
domestic P-factor is used. As a consequence a small organisation stock 
often runs a relatively large firm. This is important because the 
capacity to generate organisation input by existing organisations 
is minimal; they do not have the personnel to carry out further 
technological change, or improvement in efficiency by themselves. 
The generation of organisation input domestically faces 
another handicap because of the large technology gap between the modern 
sector and the traditional sector. The gap presents an enormous 
advantage to the modern sector firms, enabling them to earn a high 
quasi-rent despite their small organisation stock. The absence of a 
distinct causal relationship between organisation stock and quasi-
rent removes the profit incentive to generate new organisation inputs. 
The situation is often aggravated further by monopoly. The technology 
gap leads to an increasing market share for the modern sector firm in 
its market area, and ultimately to monopoly. Threat of foreign 
competition is eliminated by trade barriers and new domestic entries 
are barred by the narrowness of the market or by political maneuver® 
In such a vacuum there is no need even to generate enough organisation 
input to keep the organisation, stock intact. There is no pull., no 
push. 
In a mature economy a significant portion of organisation 
input is associated with the establishment of new firms, We have 
shown this in connection with the small-firm sequence in the last 
section, The incentive is provided by the prospect of earning quasi-
rents and is enhanced by a well-developed market for organisations: 
the stock market. For many organisers of firms the motivation canes 
from their expectation of a quasi-rent associated with the technology 
gap between the best-practice technology capital, equipment they 
install and the marginal technology in use by aged firms* The 
organisers contribute little organisation input initially: the 
T-factor input for starting the plant is lent by the capital equipment 
manufacturers. Later on they may generate some L«factor to meet the 
competition. Other organisers are more ambitious. They wish to 
enter into the large firm development sequence. They try to put 
together enough organisation stock to generate organisation inputs 
for expansion. If they are successful they will, be richly rewarded 
in the stock market. Organisation is traded in the stock market at a 
price equal to the excess of market valuation of a firm over its net 
worth. The price is based on the capitalised su: of the expected 
stream of quasi-rent. Since traders have a rather short time horizon 
and discount the future heavily, short term growth performance and 
high profits are very much favored. This stimulates the generation of 
organisation inputs Although most of the organisers do not succeed 
in lifting their firms out of the small firm sequence, their efforts 
bear fruity 
These considerations must be watered down considerably in 
an underdeveloped economy. The market for organisation is either 
23 non-existent or paper thin® Opportunities for new entry 
23. To take the Kenya Stock Exchange as an example, in a fourteen 
week period in 1.966, only 44 of the 84 listed stocks were traded, and 
21 of these were traded in three or less weeks in this period. (See 14) 
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are limited and new organisations have little incentive to build 
large organisation stocks® To begin with, the low level of purchasing 
power limits the number of industries where a modern enterprise may 
hope to succeed0 In the eligible industries the established monopoly 
or oligopoly has enacted barriers to entry that bear little relationship 
to organisation stock. Even when a foothold is successfully established 
by a new firm, the large, ready-made profit due to the technology gap 
based on foreign-supplied P-factor removes incentives to build up an 
organisation stock. 
The limited supply of organisation may be illustrated by 
empirical, data. We will take Nigeria as an example. The deficiency of 
organisation stock in Nigeria is brought out by the relative ratio of 
management, professional and clerical personnels (the non-production 
workers or Leibenstein's "non-marginal product employees") to production 
workers in industrial establishments. The former is a crude index of 
the. stock of organisation, if the. quality of organisation is disregarded 
for the time being. The latter is an index of firm size. Deficiency 
of. organisation stock is then reflected by a low NP/P ratio. 
Table One presents comparable data for Nigeria and for the 
24 
United States. In Columns (l) and (2) the number of establishments 
with twenty or more employees versus the total number of establishments 
in the two samples are given. The Nigerian sample has in fact a larger 
proportion of large establishments in most industries. This implies 
that the Nigerian sample consists mainly of modern rather than 
traditional, small-scale — establishments. With a few omissions all 
the industries covered In the Nigerian Industrial. Survey are included 
in the table so we have a nearly complete picture of modern industries 
in Nigeria. 
Two results are noteworthy. A comparison of Columns (3) 
and (4) shows that the NP/P ratio is much lower in Nigeria than its 
counterpart in the U.S. for practically all the industries. In 
addition we may look at the last two figures in Column (4). Judging 
from the U.S. experience, the. industries with a foothold in Nigeria 
have a much lower NP/P ratio than average. This deficiency in the 
24. The U.S. data are based on 1963 Census of Manufactures. 
Nigeria data are based on Nigerian Federal Office of Statistics; 
Industrial Survey, 1964-5 „ 
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quantity of organisation stock will certainly be worsened if the 
organisation quality is also taken into account. At the same time 
the limited supply of organisation members is probably also 
responsible for the high remuneration to the non-production workers 
in Nigeriau As demonstrated in Columns (5) and (6), the average 
non-production worker in Nigeria earns four times as much as the 
production worker, while the non-production worker in the U,S, earns 
only twice as much. This immediately suggests that it might be 
difficult in Nigeria to substitute organisation for lab our — - or 
to raise labour productivity by greater organisation input. We now 
proceed to look at the. question more closely. 
In the. first six columns of Table Two the different 
components of value added are given. The first four shares, expressed 
as a percent of value added, are calculated directly from the Nigerian 
Industria1 Survey, The fifth column is calculated from capital assets 
data in the survey on the following assumptions; 
(a) the interest charges are ten per cent of the total capital assets; 
(b) book value machinery, equipment, and motor vehicles depreciate at 
eight percent per annum; (c) buildings depreciate at three percent per 
annum; and (d) the total capital, share is the sum of interest charges 
and depreciation charges calculated according to (a), (b) and (c). 
The ten percent interest rate is based on the assumption that modern 
sector investors in Nigeria have access to subsidised capital. The 
depreciation rates are higher than the average, figures for the U.S. 
to reflect poorer maintenance. The estimates are of course quite 
crude, but an error of twenty or thirty percent will not affect our 
conclusions significantly. Finally Column (6), the "residual profit, 
share", is the remainder after the five shares from Columns (I.) to (5) 
have been subtracted from value added. 
The results are striking. With the exception of four 
industries, a very large residual share is left, often in excess of 
either the capital share or the labour share. According to our 
earlier arguments, this residual share has little to do with organisation 
stock; it is mostly associated with the technology gap between the 
modern sector and the traditional sector in Nigeria and with monopoly profit* 
If we make some, fairly realistic assumptions, it. is possible; to estimate 
the general magnitude of these, two components. The. necessary assumption 
ares 
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(1) The Nigerian economy consists of a modern sector and 
a traditional sector, 
(2) In Nigeria the wage rates in the modern sector and 
the traditional sector are the same and are determined by the marginal 
productivity of labour in the traditional sector. Marginal productivity 
of labour also determines the wage rate in the U.S. 
(3) Each industry in the modern sector in Nigeria employs the 
same mix of capital goods as its U.S. counterpart® 
(4) The labour productivity difference between the U.S. and 
the modern sector in Nigeria is explained solely by differences in 
efficiency. For each industry there is an efficiency multiple which 
could be used to convert labour inputs in the two countries to identical 
efficiency units. 
25 
(5) The substitution possibility is highly limited.~ 
Thus despite the large difference in relative factor prices, the same 
labour (measured in efficiency units) and capital combinations are 
used to produce a given sum of value added in the modern sector in 
Nigeria as in the U.S. 
(6) Technological advance is labour saving. The technology 
gap between the modern sector and the traditional sector (for an 
industry) is reflected by differences in marginal productivity of 
labour in the two sectors. 
(7) Quasi-'rent based on organisation differential is 
irrelevant. Hence for each industry a single efficiency multiple may be 
used, and the residual share is attributable to technology gap and 
monopoly. 
Under these assumptions it follows immediately that the 
technology gap between the modern sector and the traditional sector in 
Nigeria is measured by the wage share difference between the U.S. 
and Nigeria. Let us define: 
M1?n marginal productivity of labour in the 
traditional sector of Nigeria. 
MPn marginal productivity of labour in the modern 
sector of Nigeria. 
25. Since there are different technologies, the marginal 
productivity of labour is defined despite the limited substitution 
possibilities. 
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Table 2. Profit Estimates, Nigeria. 
(all share figures expressed as percent of value added) 
(1) 
Industry 
Production 
worker 
share 
Meat Products .16 
Dairy Products o 19 
Grain Mill Products .04 
Bakery Products .14 
Sugar Confectionary .09 
Miscellaneous Food Preparations .035 
Beer Brewing .03 
Soft Drinks .07 
Textiles .17 
Footwear .22 
Wearing Apparel .18 
Saw Milling .27 
Furniture & Fixtures .25 
Paper Products .14 
Printing .36 
Tanning & Travel Goods .18 
Rubber ,20 
Basic Industrial Chemicals .04 
Vegetable Oil Milling .13 
Paints .05 
Miscellaneous Chemicals .08 
Bricks and Tiles .20 
Cement .09 
Concrete Products .18 
Basic Metals .17 
Metal Products .17 
Electrical Equipment .09 
Average .145 
(2) (3) (4) 
Non-production Excise Other costs 
worker tax share* 
share share 
.20 o02 .09 
.24 - .09 
.07 
.07 .05 .04 
.07 .17 .03 
o 045 .60 .01 
.07 .42 o02 
.10 .09 .08 
.10 .13 .03 
.15 .28 .10 
.06 .05 .05 
.14 .02 .03 
.13 .02 .08 
.15 - .08 
.32 - .06 
.08 .06 .09 
.12 .10 .02 
.15 - o 02 
.06 - .25 
.14 .19 .09 
.16 .08 .05 
.25 - .05 
3 06 .08 .02 
.20 .10 
.25 
.13 .08 ,06 
.19 - c12 
.137 
* Includes renta 1 payments, professional fees, office material, telephone, 
postage, insurance, advertising, hired transport, and water. 
Source; See text. 
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MPyS marginal productivity of labour in the U.So 
a s the efficiency multiple. ^ 
Now consider the value added produced by one Nigerian production worker 
in some industry in the modern sector. The wage share in this case is, 
by Assumption 2j 
(Wage share)NjM = MPj^^ 
The wage share of the same value added in the U.S. is, also by 
Assumption 2; 
(Wage share)y — aMP^ 
From Assumption 4: 
Hence: 
MP.. „ ~aMPTT N,M U 
M PN sM " MPN,T = ('Wag6 s h a r e^u ~ (wage s h a r e> N,M 
By Assumption 6 we conclude the wage share difference measures the 
effect of the technology gap. To put it in another way, the wage 
share difference represents exploitation by the user of modern technology. 
Despite the higher marginal product of production workers they are paid the 
wage in the traditional sector. Since capital user costs are approximately 
equal in the modern sector of Nigeria and in the U.S., the wage share 
difference is the profit reaped from the technology gap. If the 
modern sector pays a higher wage than the traditional sector, the wage 
share difference then understates the technology gap. 
Column (9) in Table two shows that the technology gap on 
the average accounts for more than one-half of the residual share. 
Under our assumptions, the remainder is attributed to monopoly profit 
27 
based on monopoly pricing. Practically, the distinction, of the two 
types of profits is of some significance. Investment in industries with a 
2 6. In practice a is computed by dividing the average productivity 
of labour in the U,S„ by the average productivity of labour in 
Nigeria, with value-added as the numerator in the productivity 
calculation. The results are given in Column (11) of Table Two. 
27® Monopoly pricing is possible despite the coexistence of 
a modern sector and a traditional sector because the market is 
segmented. Transportation difficulties and product differentiation are 
the principal causes of the segmentation. 
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large technology gap raises the general level of productivity in the 
country while investment in. industries with high monopoly profit provides 
meager social benefit® A quantitative estimate of the two components 
such as we have just attempted is therefore useful for policy making 
in investment allocation, taxation and tariffs. 
Using Nigeria as an example, we have, now verified our 
earlier argument that firms in underdeveloped countries enjoy high 
28 
profits from technology gap and from monopoly, The. high profits 
undermine the incentive to generate, organisation inputs To illustrate, 
let the target efficiency for a firm be the level of labour efficiency 
in the U.S. Assuming other firms in the industry remain behind 
without progress, the C[U3. S jL<=> 'rent, resulting from the burst of organisation 
input is calculated by multiplying the production worker share in 
Column (1) of Table Two by (a « 1)/a , where a is the efficiency 
multiple given in Column (11)„ Results of the calculation are given in 
Column (12), Evidently the quasi-rent under such optimal circumstances 
is still small relative to the residual share already accrued to the 
firm® Actually the crucial point is that the generation of organisation 
input, may not be efficient at all if the generation implies a substitution 29 
of non-production workers for production workers. If a doubling of 
non-production workers is needed to accomplish the higher efficiency, for 
example, the qua si-rent from wage saving will be more than wiped out. 
by the increase in the share of non-production workers® The wage rate 
is simply too low for wage saving to be worthwhile, and non-production 
workers too expensive, (and perhaps too ineffective, as well.) to be 
employed for the replacement of production workers. 
Generation of organisation input is therefore an efficient 
step only in a late stage of economic development. Before this stage 
is reached exploitation of the technology gap provides a more 
attractive option. Large increase in productivity is available, and 
it can be accomplished with mostly P»factors provided from foreign 
countries. This option is made still more attractive if capital is 
28, There are of course many exceptions,(7) Overcapacity due 
to bad planning, input shortage and other bottlenecks appear to be the 
chief reasonsfor low profits or even losses. 
29, A fair correlation (rank correlation coefficients of 0,74 
and 0,67) was found by Delahanty (5) between changes in NP/P ratio and 
changes in production worker productivity in different industries in 
the U.S, 
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available at subsidised rates. There is also some emprical evidence that this 
is indeed the path followed by the underdeveloped countries,, There 
are frequent comments (for example, see 2) on their use of capital, 
intensive modern technology despite the low wage rates. As time goes on 
the rise in productivity increases the level of purchasing power and 
widens the market. Monopoly profits, hopefully with an assistance from 
the government, will start t.o lose their importance. The option of 
exploiting the technology gap also vanishes gradually. It then becomes 
more important to earn a quasi-rent by cultivating organisation inputs. 
At the same time the wage rate is higher and the supply of effective 
organisation members is greater. A substitution of organisation for 
labour becomes meaningful. Ultimately the economy matures and the point 
of reference turns to the small-firm and large-firm sequences discussed 
in the last section. In short, our conclusion is negative. Generally 
speaking the organisation supply is minimal in underdeveloped countries 
and there is little economic justification for building up a supply 
by arbitrary means. 
Importation of Organisation Input 
Our discussion in the preceding section deals with the 
domestic supply of organisation input in underdeveloped countries. 
Another option is available: the importation of organisation input 
from countries possessing rich accumulations of organisation stock. 
An important distinction should be drawn here. The direct importation 
of organisation input is usually advantageous because: such organisation 
input is often a free good or could be generated at low marginal costs 
in the exporting country. One such example is management know~how 
in the form of book knowledge. Another example--- already elaborated on 
in the last section — is the P-factor input supplied by manufacturers 
of capital equipments. In contrast, organisation input may also be 
imported incHrectly by the importation of organisation stock. The 
stock then generates organisation inputs in the host country. When 
the stock is fully integrated in the form of a firm by a super-
organisation in the exporting country, we have the case of a 
30 multinational firm. The imported firm is in a position to earn 
• 30. If the imported organisation stock is not fully integrated, 
we have the intermediate case of contracted management teams or 
consultants. 
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quasi«re.nts and monopoly profits in the same way as the domestic 
firms I The net benefit to the importing country is by no means 
obvious, and will be the subject of our analysis in the present 
sections 
The multinational firm has been described as a business 
organisation that is engaged in production in a number 
of countries through branches, subsidiaries or affiliates, 
which may or may not be separate, entities in the several 
countries in which they operates The term 'organisation' 
implies that, the entire, group, including the head office 
as well as various types of subsidiary units, is operated 
within an administrative framework which knits the whole 
together in such a way so that the general policies and 
administrative, and financial procedure of the group are 
reasonably consistent and coherent throughout the firm, 
(20, po 82) 
Organisation stands out as the distinctive feature of the multinational 
firm, A multinational, firm usually implies also direct capital 
investment and foreign ownership, but what sets it apart is the fact 
that the entry of the firm into a country brings with it an importation 
of organisation stock. To highlight, this, we will leave aside several 
issues in which discussions on multinational firms are often embroiled: 
gains and losses from foreign capital investment, effects on balance of 
payments, political influence and nationalism. 
The multinational firm is ordinarily multi-divisional, and we 
may be. guided by Williamson's excellent analysis (25) of this type of 
firms Its standard feature is a division of labour between the 
general office and the divisions, after the firm has reached a size 
where direct supervision by the chief executive over the various divisions 
of the firm becomes ineffective® The general, office is principally 
concerned with strategic decisions involving planning, appraisal, 
control, and the allocation of resources among the competing operational 
divisions. It is committed to the overall, performance of the firm. 
Each division under the general office is responsible for its 
operation,, The advantages of this structure derive mostly from the 
presence, of an independent: elite staff and from the restoration of 
integrity to the goal-specification process <-«« away from the 
squabbles and influences of divisional, executives preoccupied with 
their vested interests© 
29 -
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The multinational firm therefore appears to contribute 
towards the rational allocation of world resources; a supra-national 
arrangement by which capital and organisation resources both flow to 
countries where profit is the highest. But what determines profit? 
In underdeveloped countries profts are found in areas where quasi-
rent from the technology gap and monopoly profits are high. A 
multinational firm may bring with it a highly efficient organisation, 
but efficiency or organisation demand is not the main criterion used 
by the firm. Efficient organisation may actually be wasted if wage 
is so low that wage saving is unimportant. 
The case against the multinational firm from the point of 
view of the underdeveloped country goes beyond this. The frame of 
reference for the multinational firm differs from the domestic firm. 
The supply of organisation stock for the multinational firm hinges on 
the profitability comparison for a cross-section of the countries. The 
multinational firm also has a mobility unmatched by national firms. It 
can withhold further expansion or even withdraw its organisation 
investment in a country if profitability falls. Consequently a 
multinational firm may pull out of a country when her growth hits a 
snarl — just at a time when its contribution to economic development 
is most neededo 
The multinational firm may also stifle the growth of domestic 
organisation stock. Drawing on its experience and vast resources, the 
superior organisation stock possessed by the multinational firm gives the 
firm a competitive edge. The firm chooses the most profitable industry 
for its entry, and then drives off the domestic competitors. Domestic 
firms are left with the less profitable opportunities. Since large 
profit is often needed to overcome inertia and the cultural trap and to 
offset the disadvantage of initial inexperience, fewer domestic 
organisationcjwill be formed. 
Finally the cost of the organisation stock provided by a 
multinational firm is also higher than that of a domestic firm. In 
the first place, the opportunity cost of the former is high because 
the multinational firm can choose to invest its organisation stock 
among a larger set of opportunities in many different nations. The 
multinational firm is also likely to discount heavily the expected 
profits in the underdeveloped countries because of political instability 
and nationalism. In addition the expatriates sent by the multinational 
firm have to be compensated for their relocation with extra remuneration, 
and such costs must be deducted from the profits. In the long-run, 
30 -
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therefore, domestic supply of organisation stock will turn out to be 
cheaper — provided the multinational, firms have not established 
a stranglehold, 
A rather different picture emerges if the multinational, firm 
is given only a temporary stay in an underdeveloped country. Sometimes 
the technology of an industry is so complex that P*factor input 
supplied by the capital goods manufacturers is insufficient for the 
continuous operation of the firm. Alternatively some technology is 
not public knowledge and can be employed only with the import of an 
accompanying organisation stock. Under these circumstances it is 
both necessary and often desirable to allow the temporary stay of a 
multinational firm — until domestic personnel and capital, have been 
built up to take it over. The advantage of this strategy is that 
the new technology is transmitted at a minimum cost. In addition, 
when the expatriate management team departs, they leave behind — 
often at no costs at all. ... a tested organisation structure with 
established codes, rules and channels of decision and information 
flow. To implement this strategy the multinational firms must be 
obligated to undertake, training responsibilities. If the technology 
gap and monopoly proft are. insufficient to induce the multinational 
firm to offer a temporary commitment, the use of foreign management 
teams, consulting services or training missions might also serve the 
same purposes. 
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